Oil Wealth and Federal Conflict in American Petrofederations

<i>Oil wealth and Federal Conflict in American Petrofederations</i> documents the critical relationship between oil rents and federal conflicts, illustrated with six representative cross-regional case studies. Each case study discusses encompasses qualitative, quantitative and comparative elements under a common structure. With each petrofederation ranging in conflict types and modalities, the work as a whole identifies key differences including oil rent decentralization (in terms of resource property, sector management and distribution of revenues); sectoral importance (considered at national and subnational levels); and federation redistribution policy (in terms of fiscal federal imbalance, fiscal equalization, and oil rent use for regional equity). Collectively, it generalizes a consistent theory of causality between oil rents and federal conflicts that take into account systemic variables. Its conclusions serve as a guide for researchers and policymakers seeking pathways to transla