Epistemology of Modality

<P>Claims about modality - what is necessary, possible, or impossible - abound in philosophy and go back to Plato. They are also at the heart of contemporary debates in philosophy. But what can we actually <I>know</I> about what is necessary, possible or impossible? This is the first book to provide a thorough introduction to the problem of modal epistemology, examining its main theories and weighing up competing arguments and solutions. </P><P></P><P>Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates:</P><P></P><UL><P><LI>realism and possible worlds, particularly David Lewis¿s modal realism and Armstrong¿s combinatorial theory of possibility</LI><LI>anti-realism and possible worlds, including fictionalist accounts and conventionalist views about modality</LI><LI>three main theories of modal epistemology: conceivability, linguistic undersatnding, and counterfactual reasoning </LI><LI>modalism</LI><LI>modal scepticism.</LI><P><