Informal Institutions in Judicial Decision-making

Despite their traditionally formalized conception, courts operate within a myriad of informal institutions that decisively influence the resolution of cases. This book analyzes informal institutions in judicial decision-making, drawing documented examples from apex and constitutional courts in multiple jurisdictions. The work discusses the methodological challenges of comparative analysis of informal institutions in judicial decision-making, namely, scarce access to information and difficulties in cross-comparison. It maps over sixty informal institutions within different courts throughout five broad procedural stages—agenda setting/docket control, procedural functions, deliberation, and opinion writing, as well as documenting the informal sanctions associated with their breaching. From a theoretical perspective, the study delves into the relatively underexplored positive effects of informal institutions, the variation of policy goals pursued by said institutions throughout time, their different conceptualization in civil and common law jurisdictions, as well as the relative impact that certain institutional features, such as Court size, appointments, and rotations may have on the endurance of informal institutions in judicial decision-making. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of Constitutional Law and Politics, Comparative Constitutional Law, Courts, and the Judiciary.